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Introduction
In the realm of civil discovery (‘disclosure’ in some
jurisdictions) most attorneys in the United States tend
to adopt a flexible approach to discovery, because the
rules tend to encourage cooperation and give parties
significant flexibility to jointly agree on a set of
discovery practices. In general, this practice makes
sense, because courts only become involved when there
is a dispute. Otherwise the parties conduct discovery in
a manner that fits the case and the resources they have
available. However, the process presumes that
attorneys for both sides are qualified to address the
numerous issues that arise during discovery. While it is
true that clients are ultimately responsible for the
competency of their attorneys, it is also true that the
legitimacy of our litigation process is undermined each
time attorneys conspire, usually unwittingly, to impose
unnecessary costs and an unreliable discovery process
on their clients due to their lack of understanding of the
information they are seeking to discover, the tools that
are available to them, and the potential consequences
to third parties.
Such a scenario is a daily occurrence in the area of e-
discovery where attorneys for each side will negotiate
away large swaths of data repositories within a
company, accept data without any chain of custody,
ignore meta data, and show no concern about the
format that the data is produced. All this is not designed
to limit discovery to what is important and to control
costs. Instead, it is designed to keep matters on a level
that they can understand and that their frequently
underfunded and litigation support team that does not
have the necessary skills can accommodate. Anecdotal
comments from judges bear out the fact that such
practices are common, and if both attorneys agree,
there is little judges can do other than offer advice.
Where this behaviour affects only the two parties, it is
fair to say that there are more important things to worry
about. However, litigation rarely occurs in a vacuum.
Third party interests are often implicated. In discovery,
all documents in the possession of each party are
usually open to being seen by the other side. This could
potentially include third party information that may be
more valuable to the third party than the litigants.
Additionally, privacy laws frequently limit the purposes
for which such information can be used and require
special authorization for use in litigation, particularly
when the subject or data owner is not a party to the
case.
As technology evolves, the implications for litigation
must also evolve. Traditionally, discovery meant that a
requesting party requested information relevant to the
litigation with some degree of specificity, and the
responding party then set about finding, collecting, and
ultimately producing that data after reviewing it for
relevancy and privilege. The process was fairly
straightforward and limited by how the information was
collected. Because the traditional method involved
paper documents that were typically in the possession
of a single person, usually known as the document
custodian, it made sense that attorneys would simply
issue a legal hold memorandum to such persons
notifying them of the litigation, identifying the kinds of
documents that would be relevant, requesting such
documents be preserved, and providing a mechanism to
deliver the documents or have them photocopied. In
most cases, it was the document custodian who
searched and delivered the relevant documents.
Whether he or she was also responsible for doing the
photocopying, sorting, or delivery, the law understood
the location of the document custodian and the location
of the documents to be synonymous. Discovery rules
focused on the fact that a person under the jurisdiction
of the court, usually as a function of their being the
employee of one of the parties, was under an
obligation, and sometimes compelled, to produce the
documents. The document reviews, photocopying,
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support functions that flow from the obligations of the
custodian of the document.
While courts may not always have direct jurisdiction
over custodians of documents, particularly if they reside
in another state or a foreign country, they still impose
the obligation on the custodian indirectly through the
jurisdiction they assert on the custodian’s employer. The
court will require the employer to direct its employees
to produce a particular document. In addition to
producing a clear chain of responsibility, it also allows
any assertions based on privilege, privacy laws, export
controls, or a sovereign’s outright rejection of the
litigation to be heard with respect to the document
being requested. Because the same sovereign has
immediate jurisdiction over both the custodian of the
document and the document itself, it is in a good
position to restrict its transfer and eventual production.
Until recently, the same concept applied to
electronically stored information. While the internet has
provided people with instantaneous access to
information world-wide, the data most frequently
requested in litigation is still modeled after the paper
method. The custodian of the data, usually a system
administrator or designated data owner, is still
requested to produce the information, and significantly,
that custodian is usually located within close proximity
to where the data is stored. Such proximity may be in
another room or another building, but there is a good
chance that it is still within the same jurisdiction.
Moreover, based on the method typically used to collect
the data that is discussed below, the litigation support
team, in conjunction with the custodian, usually collects
the data directly from the computer that it is stored on
or over the network on a computer nearby. Either way,
those collecting the data for the purposes of discovery
are usually present in the jurisdiction where the data is
stored even if it is collected and then loaded onto a
repository in another jurisdiction.
What this article seeks to examine is the changing
nature of both e-discovery and how data is stored. As
new e-discovery technologies are deployed, the
potential for widespread collection using remote means
not facilitated by a local data custodian is becoming a
reality. Because discovery in the United States does not
typically involve the court for matters relating to the
collection of discoverable material by the producing
party, case law is rather limited and discussions about
the significance of the location of electronically stored
information and any possible restrictions on remote
collection are non-existent. In fact, ‘no court has
squarely addressed where electronic materials are
“located” for discovery purposes.’1 Because jurisdiction
and the ability to effectively adjudicate discovery
disputes involving both litigants and third parties is
generally a product of location in most common law
countries, it is important that the law catch up with the
technology.
Framing technology issues
The gathering of evidence for litigation is typically
directed by counsel whereby the likely locations of
relevant information and their custodians are identified.
Then legal holds are issued to the custodian who can
include both the imputed data owner, which may be a
business manager charged with overseeing the
business processes that generated or collected the
data, and potentially a data custodian, who may be an
IT manager or system manager but who is just as likely
to be an employee who is simply storing the relevant
data on his or her desktop or laptop. Similarly, in the
physical world, there are imputed document owners and
document custodians. In both situations, both the
custodian and the data owner are frequently situated at
the same geographic location and usually in the same
jurisdiction. In some cases, centralized mainframe
computers had required some physical separation.
However, in discovery matters, the person physically co-
located with the system was usually the person given
the task with extracting the data that was required.
Additionally, despite the ability to obtain access to the
date remotely, there was little question of its location.
The only type of remote discovery that has been
considered somewhat routine, is the collection of
publicly available information available on the internet.
In this case, production is hardly necessary, because the
requesting parties can simply search the internet to
collect whatever information they choose.
Consequently, for the purposes of this article, remote
discovery involves the collection and eventual
production of non-public information. This includes
desktops and laptop computers, servers with directly
attached storage, storage area networks, and removable
media. Almost by definition, remote access to these
storage devices involves some sort of network, either
through a traditional circuit-switched telephone
network, or dial-up, and, more typically, via a packet-
1 Gary B. Born and Peter B. Rutledge, International
Civil Litigation in United States Courts (4th edition,
Wolters Kluwer Law and Business, 2007), 930.
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based network such as the internet or similar sub-
networks within an organization with connectivity being
provided locally by the organization or over long
distance using internet or private leased line
connectivity. In either case, higher level protocols using
encryption, circuit virtualization, authentication, and
other means can ensure that such connectivity remains
private. Within these private networks, the conventional
notions of storage and application services are radically
changing. No longer is storage tied to a single
processing device. It can serve multiple application
servers all at once. Moreover, the storage can be
distributed across national boundaries as needed.
Using sophisticated data mapping technology, what
appears to an end user to be a single file or directory at
one location could actually be bits stored on multiple
devices in several different countries. Moreover, the
application retrieving the file for processing and
eventual output to the user could also have components
residing in multiple locations and potentially owned by
a third party. These are called cloud computing
applications. While in essence they are a throw-back to
mainframe computing concepts of shared processing,
cloud computing will probably revolutionize computing
and fundamentally alter the notion of electronically
stored information. The change is not so much that
remote discovery is now possible. In some form, the
potential for remote discovery of electronic data has
existed as long as there have been computer modems.
Instead, the fundamental change is that some discovery
can only be achieved remotely, given how some
applications and their data are now structured.
Even if the notions of cloud computing and
geographically distributed storage are yet to become
commonplace, other factors are making remote
discovery an all but unavoidable scenario in litigation.
Due to the globalization of many corporations and the
need to collaborate, the operation of largely
autonomous subsidiaries organized by country has
largely vanished. High network bandwidth over long
distances has meant that information technologies can
simultaneously use data stored in multiple places and
the need to have ‘local’ copies of all data needed by the
local users has all but vanished in many large
organizations. Moreover, enterprise search technologies
are being deployed in a way where data owners can
authorize data custodians to grant access to
appropriate parties and refrain from overseeing such
access. They are no longer the go-between in satisfying
requests for data. Instead, once access is granted, the
data can be available world-wide, subject to export
control and privacy laws. Individuals often have no
concept of where the data is physically located, nor do
they care. They may be aware that a particular
document was written by an employee residing in
another country, but they have no way of knowing if it
was actually drafted in that other country. Also, in the
spirit of collaboration, documents are routinely edited
and data is supplied from a number of countries. This
means that to argue that the data falls under the
sovereignty of a particular nation or US state based on
the nationality of the author or the location of
authorship is a misnomer. While privacy and export
control laws may dictate some degree of data
segregation by country, such laws are rendered otiose
by the vast amount of data involved in commercial
litigation that does not fall into those categories.
Additionally, with the Safe Harbor provisions,2 privacy
laws, arguably, may no longer require that covered data
honour national boundaries.
Traditional legal issues with cross border
discovery
Aside from the logistical challenges brought by new
technology, legal issues also present challenges of their
own. Because there is limited legal precedent for
remote discovery, the focus will be on drawing parallels
with cross border discovery decisions. From a statutory
and administrative perspective, discovery is the same
whether the activity is conducted in the United States or
abroad. Unless a judge is asked to compel discovery,
litigants are free to request and conduct depositions
and request production of information wherever it might
reside.3 When a court orders foreign discovery,
additional considerations may need to be addressed. As
described below, the court jurisdiction will usually be
the primary arbiter in deciding whether discovery can be
compelled. The potential interests of third parties, when
2 Under provisions of Directive 95/46/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 24
October 1995 on the protection of individuals with
regard to the processing of personal data and on
the free movement of such data, OJ L281, 23.11.95,
p. 31 (EU Data Protection Directive), and its
national implementing laws, countries such as the
United States may be allowed to hold private data
on European citizens if the country provides for
legislation that legally obligates organizations
receiving such data to follow the provisions of the
Data Protection Data Directive and guidance from
individuals nations with respect to dissemination
and uses for that data. U.S. Department of
Commerce, Safe Harbor Privacy Principles (July 21,
2000), http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/
SH_Privacy.asp.
3 Fed. Rule Civ.Proc. Rule 28(a)(1) provides for
depositions in a foreign country and may require
some notice depending upon how the deposition
is procured.
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no challenge is raised, are usually not considered in the
absence of a third party being added to the
proceedings. Because most discovery efforts are carried
out with little or no public notice, third parties typically
have no way of effectively intervening. This presents
some interesting privacy and sovereignty considerations
that are discuss below.
Ultimately, the issue is often that non-US jurisdictions
find the American discovery process unwieldy and
fundamentally flawed. They see its stated goal of
learning the truth through exhaustive review of all
relevant information as simply a charade meant to mask
the true intent of the litigants, which is to conduct
fishing expeditions designed to increase the other
party’s costs, expose embarrassing facts that are only
tangentially related to the matter at hand, and engage
in countless acts of gamesmanship and chest thumping
to distract the fact finder from the case and enhance the
image of the attorneys. While the statistics that show
only a small percentage of cases reaching trial would
seem to support the claim that the American litigation
system is unwieldy, it is misleading to suggest that such
an outcome is based on the system’s overwhelming
discovery burdens or the publicity sought by attorneys.
When used effectively, discovery can be the mechanism
that unearths corruption, holds large organizations
accountable, and gives litigants with limited means the
opportunity to make their case. While true smoking
guns are rare, discovery often forces settlement
because the information produced by each side
provides overwhelmingly evidence that favours one
party or the other. The fact that litigants in civil
proceedings routinely produce incriminating information
that it likely to be used against them is a testament to
not only the effectiveness of the discovery process, but
of their adherence to ethical conventions and the rule of
law. That said, the process is not without its faults. The
process can certainly be expensive and unwieldy, with
many of its failures not a product of its fundamental
principles, but rather adherence to inefficient processes
and poor use of technology. Nonetheless, as the
processes and revised and the technology is improved,
it must be recognized that streamlining processes to
more efficiently adhere to these principles may have the
unintended effect of denigrating the principles that
others hold dear. While compromising principles may




While most legal issues with remote electronic
discovery involve the movement of data across national
borders, there are a few issues that are relevant
between US states. While states are typically obliged to
honour requests made by courts of other states and
generally show deference to depositions and document
productions that originate from litigation in another
state, it remains the expectation that some protocol
should be followed. For example, where a judge
authorizes a party to seize evidence from the other
litigant in another state, it is expected that local law
enforcement will be engaged and perhaps even local
courts will enforce the order.
Recently, some states have passed laws requiring that
computer forensics examinations that are part of
litigation be performed by licensed private
investigators.4 While this particular requirement is
problematic on a number of levels, it does reflect states’
desire to assert some quality controls over the process
of collecting evidence and to retain oversight over the
process. However, the laws are unclear whether they
4 2008 American Bar Association Section of Science
& Technology Law, Report to the House of
Delegates 301, available at http://www.abanet.
org/scitech/301.doc (noting specific PI licensure
requirements for performing computer forensics in
Illinois, Texas, Michigan, Georgia, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, North Carolina (pending),
Massachusetts, Nevada, New York).
When used effectively, discovery can be the mechanism
that unearths corruption, holds large organizations
accountable, and gives litigants with limited means the
opportunity to make their case. 
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would apply to remote electronic discovery. While the
South Carolina Attorney General has asserted that any
computer forensic examinations performed in other
states must be conducted by a South Carolina licensed
private investigator when the evidence is gathered to be
used in a South Carolina court proceeding, there is no
such guidance for evidence remotely gathered using a
computer forensics process on a device located in a
state with such a private investigator requirement where
the information is to be used in a matter outside that
state.5 This is despite the fact that some of these states
have asserted that licensed private investigators be
used when computer forensics is performed in their
jurisdiction regardless of where the evidence will
ultimately presented and even applies if no litigation is
anticipated. It is one of many examples where laws are
written too simplistically to resolve a perceived problem
rather than to address the true objectives of the
situation. The quality of computer forensic examination
is certainly an issue that needs to be addressed.
However, the solution proposed and implemented is not
always the most appropriate. Rather than passing a law
that is enforceable in the least costly manner possible
but ineffective at accomplishing the objective, states
should recognize that the true solution may be to learn
more about the problem, seek consensus where
possible, and regulate last. Failing to do so simply leads
to circumvention and higher costs and ultimately causes
more harm to the very people it seeks to protect.
Aside from forensic examinations, the very notion of
remotely collecting data in other states raises a number
of issues relating to the state’s desire to accord
privileges to its citizens. Because most state privacy
laws target personal data about its citizens without
regard to location, the privacy aspects seem not to be
implicated. Moreover, constitutional protections of
interstate commerce would seem to preclude a state
from restricting the flow of such data. However, because
this data may be destined for a court, practitioners
should be wary of state specific privileges that may
arise. Conflict of law principles are far from settled in
this area as it is unclear whether privileges apply to
data at the point it is generated or in the state where
the court is located.
International
By far the most significant legal issues with remote
discovery involve data that passes across international
borders. Because remote discovery typically does not
require anyone in the foreign country to facilitate the
data transfer, such transfers can be transferred with
relative ease. Typical foreign discovery challenges
usually involve conducting depositions in another
country or requesting someone in that country to
produce a document. For the most part, there is little
authority on the issue of whether the fact that no one
involved in the discovery need be present in that
country raises any concerns. The typical remote
discovery scenario would be where relevant information
resides on a server in a branch office of a multi-national
company that was outside the United States. Assuming
that personnel in the United States already have remote
access to the data, then a foreign government has
limited ability to prevent access, because it cannot
sanction anyone under its jurisdiction for the immediate
transfer. After all, ‘[t]he location of the person, not the
document, is also a hallmark of discovery under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: “Persons resident or
found within the United States may have in their
possession or under their control evidence located
abroad. It has long been recognized that such persons
may be required to produce such evidence in courts in
the United States.”’6 However, if a local employee of the
company is required to grant access or otherwise
facilitate the transfer before it can be sent, then foreign
law may pose some challenges depending upon the
data at issue, because the facilitator risks violating their
own law or causing their employer to violate US law.
Beyond the unique circumstances associated with
remote discovery, the challenges posed by discovery of
information in a foreign country for use in a US
proceeding can be daunting. As mentioned above, many
countries, particularly those using the civil law system,
show a particular distaste for the American discovery
process. ‘As of 1986, some 15 states had adopted
legislation expressly designed to counter United States
efforts to secure production of documents situated
outside the United States.’7 These have taken a number
of forms, from providing mechanisms for its citizens to
5 Deb Radcliff, ‘Computer Forensics Faces Private
Eye Competition’ Baselinemag, January 2, 2008, p
1 http://www.baselinemag.com. (‘In April [2007],
the state attorney general opined that even if you
never set foot in South Carolina, if you're collecting
evidence to be used in court here, you still need a
South Carolina [PI] license’, says Steve Abrams, a
licensed independent PI and computer forensic
examiner based in Sullivans Island, S.C. ‘Licensing
authorities in New York, Pennsylvania, Texas and
Oregon have opined the same way.’)
6 Charles McClellan, America, ‘Land of
(Extraterritorial) Discovery: Section 1782 Discovery
for Foreign Litigants’, 17 Transnational Law &
Contemporary Problems 809, 822 (2008) (quoting
Hans Smit, ‘American Assistance to Litigation in
Foreign Aid and International Tribunals: Section
1782 Title 28 of the U.S.C. Revisited’, 25 Syracuse
Journal of International Law and Commerce, 1, 10
n.46 (1998)).
7 Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations Law § 442,
Reporters’ Note 1 (1987).
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refuse requests, to prohibiting its citizens from
cooperating altogether in the case of France.8 The
process generally acceptable to most countries is
through the Hague Convention on the Taking of
Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters.9 That
treaty calls for letters of request to be issued by the
court having jurisdiction over the matter and sent to the
relevant authority in the country where evidence is
being sought. While this process has assisted litigants
who previously had no recourse when seeking discovery
of witnesses or documents located in a foreign country,
the US Supreme Court noted in the seminal case of
Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. District
Court10 that the use of the treaty is not mandatory in
foreign discovery matters and that it does not override
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.11 In this case, the
Supreme Court took a pragmatic view in suggesting that
the treaty was merely in place to protect the rights of
foreign litigants and that where both parties are
amenable to the discovery request, there is no need to
involve foreign authorities in the matter. Justice
Blackmun’s dissent clearly alludes to this perception
and argues that with the civil law system, in particular,
the process by which evidence is collected, normally by
a judge rather than the litigants, is as much a part of the
analysis as the willingness of parties to comply with the
request. He notes judges are often entrusted with the
role of balancing the rights of the parties as well as the
rights of the public as a whole, including affected third
parties, when deciding whether to transfer that
evidence to a foreign court.12
Considering the view of the majority and similar
holdings in other courts that effectively suggest that the
treaty’s procedures should be the last resort rather than
the first, it would be safe to conclude that remote
discovery would probably be a matter requiring little, if
any, consultation with foreign authorities as far as US
courts are concerned. In effect, what little related case
law on this subject tends to bear this out. For example,
in 2002, Vasily Gorshkov was convicted of stealing
credit card numbers by a Seattle-based federal court.
The evidence in the case was gathered by FBI agents
who lured Gorshkov and his accomplice into the United
States from Russia, where through an undercover ruse,
they asked the two men to type their username and
password into a computer the FBI was monitoring. The
account credentials were for a computer located in
Russia. The agents then used the credentials to gain
access to that computer and download the evidence
implicating the two in multiple cases of fraud. Because
the FBI used its own computer, told the defendants they
wanted to watch them, and obtained a search warrant
before viewing the downloaded file, the Federal District
Court Judge ruled that the evidence was admissible and
that the FBI had done nothing wrong. He further
asserted that the fact that the agents’ action violated
the law of the Russian Federation was not relevant
because the law of the Russian Federation did not
apply.13 It transpires that the Russian authorities did not
agree, and filed a criminal complaint against the agents,
while the agents received the Director’s Award for
Excellence as a result of the successful sting operation.14
While such a flagrant flaunting of another nation’s
laws may result in the exclusion of evidence in civil
matters, courts have nonetheless shown that US
interests, particularly those of the litigants, come first.
In response to blocking statutes, courts have adopted a
five factor test for considering whether a party should
be compelled to produce information that resides in
another jurisdiction, particularly in cases where the
party needs to travel to that country to retrieve it or
request employees in the foreign country to facilitate its
delivery even when the foreign nation specifically
forbids it. The factors include: (1) the importance to the
litigation of the information requested; (2) the degree of
specificity of request; (3) whether the information
originated in the United States; (4) the availability of
alternative means of securing the information; (5) the
extent to which failure to comply would undermine the
interests of the United States or compliance with the
request would undermine the interests of a foreign
sovereign nation.15 However, case law suggests if the
8 James Chalmers, ‘The Hague Evidence Convention
and Discovery Inter Parties: Trial Court Decisions
Post Aerospatiale’, 8 Tulane Journal of
International and Comparative Law 189, 213 (2000)
(noting that ‘[i]t is difficult to take the French
‘blocking statute’ at face value given that, taken
literally, it appears to prevent French nationals
doing business abroad from taking court action in
foreign tribunals. Instead, it appears that the
statute was intended to assist French nationals
involved in litigation abroad by providing them
with a reason for refusing to disclose
information.’)
9 Opened for signature, 18 March 1970, 23 U.S.T.
2555, T.I.A.S. 7444, 847 U.N.T.S. 231.
10 482 U.S. 522 (1987)
11 482 U.S. 522 (1987) at 544 (declining to hold to
hold, as a blanket matter, that comity requires
resort to Hague Evidence Convention procedures
without prior scrutiny in each case of the particular
facts, sovereign interests, and likelihood that
resort to those procedures will prove effective).
12 482 U.S. 522 (1987) at 548 (Blackmun, J,
dissenting) (‘In my view, the Convention provides
effective discovery procedures that largely
eliminate the conflicts between United States and
foreign law on evidence-gathering. I therefore
would apply a general presumption that, in most
cases, courts should resort first to the
Convention.’).
13 Mike Brunker, Judge OKs FBI hack of Russian
computers, ZDNet, 31 May 2001,
http://news.zdnet.com/2100-9595_22-115961.html.
14 Lawyer to challenge FBI in Russian sting, Reuters,
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discovery request could be satisfied without leaving the
United States or requesting the aid of someone in a
foreign country through a means such as remote
discovery, courts are not likely to even consider treaty
requirements or blocking statutes when deciding
whether to grant the request to compel.16
While the court’s inclination to ignore the wishes of a
foreign government in both civil and criminal cases is
certainly the most expedient means of resolving a
discovery dispute when that foreign government’s
assistance is not needed, it is nonetheless troubling.
Disregard for international comity can arise in other
forums that are not directly of interest to the court or
the litigants but could have a chilling effect on future
cross border litigation and even the transfer of data
across borders outside litigation. For example, under
provisions of the EU Data Protection Directive17 and its
subsequent enforcement of member nations, the
default position is that the United States does not have
sufficient data protection laws for the protection of
personal data to permit the transfer of such data.
However, under the Safe Harbor provisions negotiated
with the US Department of Commerce,18 an organization
can voluntary submit to such provisions that the
Department of Commerce will then enforce as a
condition of receiving personal data on EU citizens.
However, the Safe Harbor provisions are problematic
within the context of discovery, because the provisions
only apply to data transferred to another country but
within the same organization. Because the purpose of
discovery is to disclose data to another party, the Safe
Harbor provisions do not provide adequate protection.
Additionally, while consent of the subject of the data is
usually sufficient to exempt the application of privacy
laws, where the consent is by an employee, EU
authorities typically view such consent as coerced and
therefore not allowed.19 As an alternative, the EU Data
Protection Directive does allow for transfers outside the
Safe Harbor protection where ‘the transfer is necessary .
. . for the establishment, exercise or defense of legal
claims.’20 However, such transfers must be ordered by a
European judicial authority pursuant to a letter of
request, such as provided for under the Hague
Convention.21 Based on recent precedent, litigants are
not likely to make such a request if the information can
readily be obtained by simply obtaining access to a
remote computer.
As a result, the situation is difficult. As technology
advances to the point that multinational corporations
can easily resort to these self-help measures without
risking sanctions or even awareness by foreign
governments that this is going on, the pattern will
continue, with the criteria for compliance being US
privacy laws that Europeans, in particular, find
inadequate. However, it may take one significant and
public privacy breach to convince European
governments that the Safe Harbor provisions are
relatively weak within the US legal system and may be
rescinded, making cross company communications
problematic across borders. Other implications could be
outright refusal to allow US persons direct remote
access to the personal data of EU citizens residing on
systems within an EU country. Ultimately, distributed
storage and cloud computing may either make that
discussion moot, or laws could effectively limit the use
of such technology across national borders. Given the
undesirable consequences that could result from direct
regulation of such technology for the regulating country,
it is to be hoped that a more efficient solution that
preserves international comity and the rights of each
country’s citizens while satisfying the demands of the
US discovery system will come about. The models
described above could work, but no one currently has
the incentive to implement them.
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15 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations §
442(1)(c) (1987)
16 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Working
Document 1/2009 on pre-trial discovery for cross
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17 EU Data Protection Directive at 31–50.
18 U.S. Department of Commerce, Safe Harbor Privacy
Principles (July 21, 2000),
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/SH_Privacy.asp.
19 Carla L. Reyes, ‘The US Discovery-EU Privacy
Directive Conflict: Constructing a Three-Tiered
Compliance Strategy’, 19 Duke Journal of
Comparative and International Law 357, 374-78
(2009) (discussing limitations of Safe Harbor
provisions and consent); but see Stanley W.
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Privacy & Security Law Report 1, 5 (Oct. 15, 2007)
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sufficient).
20 EU Data Protection Directive, art. 26(1)(d).
21 Carla L. Reyes, The US Discovery-EU Privacy
Directive Conflict: Constructing a Three-Tiered
Compliance Strategy, note 17, at 365-66.
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